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INTRODUCTION
The law of insider trading is judicially created; no statutory provision ex-
plicitly prohibits trading on the basis of material, non-public information.I
The Supreme Court's insider trading jurisprudence was forged, in large part,
by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. His opinions for the Court in United States
v. Chiarella2 and SEC v. Dirks3 were, until recently, the Supreme Court's
only pronouncements on the law of insider trading. 4 Those decisions estab-
lished the elements of the classical theory of insider trading under § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").5 Under this the-
The "short-swing" profits rule of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which allows an issuer to sue an insider for "any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase of any equity security of such issuer (other than an ex-
empted security) within any period of less than six months," has a much narrower scope.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
2 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (holding that in an open-market transaction, no duty
arose solely from the possession of inside information).
3 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of a corporation... only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to
the shareholders ... and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach").
4 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (raising the question of
the validity of the misappropriation theory of insider trading). The Court split 4-4 on the
misappropriation theory counts and its opinion therefore did not discuss the theory. See
id. The Court unanimously affirmed convictions for mail and wire fraud. See id.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (proscribing the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe"). Section 10(b) is imple-
mented through Commission Rule lOb-5, which provides, in relevant part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person .... (a) To employ any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud, [or] ... (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
[Vol. 78:13
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ory, corporate insiders and their tippees who trade in their corporation's se-
curities while in possession of confidential information violate duties owed to
the corporation's shareholders with whom they trade.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. O'Hagan,6 which
upheld the misappropriation theory of insider trading, provides an occasion
for reassessing Justice Powell's contributions to the law of insider trading.
The misappropriation theory differs from the classical theory in that it applies
when an agent or other fiduciary misuses information entrusted to her by her
principal to trade in securities, whether or not those securities were issued by
her principal. The Court's decision in O'Hagan breaks new ground in es-
tablishing a foundation for insider trading based on common law agency
principles, 7 thereby departing from Powell's vision of the scope of insider
trading prohibited by § 10(b).
This Article explores Justice Powell's legacy for the law of insider trading
and traces the development of insider trading jurisprudence through
O'Hagan. Part I analyzes Justice Powell's opinions in Chiarella and Dirks.
These opinions form the contours of the classical theory, and can be read as
Powell's response to what he evidently perceived to be overreaching by the
Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
Powell sought to restrain the government's attack against insider trading by
anchoring insider trading law to his interpretation of the common law of de-
ceit. Part I concludes with a discussion of the doctrinal puzzles created by
Powell's reliance on the common law of deceit as the basis for insider trad-
ing liability under the federal securities laws.
Part II traces the judicial development of the misappropriation theory.
First articulated by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his dissenting opinion in
Chiarella,8 the misappropriation theory was adopted and refined by the Sec-
ond Circuit. 9 The Second Circuit's development of the theory ultimately
17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5(b) (1997).
6 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-14 (1997) (holding that a person who trades in securities, using
confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information, may be held liable for violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
I See id. at 2202-03 (noting that the fiduciary commits the fraud when she uses her
principal's confidential information in purchasing or selling securities without prior disclo-
sure).
8 See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 239 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
9 See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). Defendant James
Mitchell Newman worked as a securities trader and manager of the trading department of
a New York brokerage firm. See id. at 15. E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. and Adrian Antoniu
misappropriated confidential information concerning mergers and acquisitions that was
entrusted to their employers, the investment banking firms of Morgan Stanley and Kuhn
Loeb & Co., respectively. See id. This information was secretly conveyed to Newman,
who subsequently purchased stock in companies that were merger and takeover targets of
clients Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb & Co. See id. The Second Circuit held that
Newman's involvement in the transaction operated as a fraud under Rule lOb-5. See id. at
1998]
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lead to United States v. Carpenter,10 the first case involving the misappro-
priation theory to reach the Supreme Court.
Carpenter highlights the sharp distinction between the misappropriation
theory and Justice Powell's view of the law of insider trading. Although the
Court originally voted to deny certiorari in Carpenter," Justice Powell pre-
pared and circulated a dissent from that denial, in which he rejected the mis-
appropriation theory as both inconsistent with Chiarella and Dirks, and for
failing to meet § 10(b)'s requirement that the fraud be "in connection with"
12
the purchase or sale of a security. 13 Evidently persuaded of the issue's im-
portance by Powell's draft dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia and William F.
Brennan, Jr. changed their minds and voted to grant certiorari.14 Before the
following term when Carpenter was argued and decided, however, Powell
retired from the Court. Consequently, the Court split 4-4 on the misappro-
priation theory, leaving its validity unresolved.15 Had Powell remained on
the Court for another term, the misappropriation theory almost certainly
would have been overturned in 1987.
Powell's objections to the misappropriation theory were rebuffed by the
Supreme Court a decade later in O'Hagan, when the validity of the misap-
propriation theory was finally decided.' 6 Part II concludes with a discussion
19. The court reasoned that, "by sullying the reputations of [the investment bankers] as
safe repositories of client confidences, [Newman] and his cohorts defrauded those
[investment bankers'] clients, whose takeover plans were keyed to target company stock
prices fixed by market forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by purloiners of
confidential information." Id. at 17; cf. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 5 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding in a private damages action, that although there was a duty to disclose
or abstain, the duty was owed to the tipper's employer who was neither a purchaser nor
seller of securities, and thus no duty was owed to open-market sellers of the securities in
question).
10 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
I Because the Court ultimately granted certiorari in Carpenter, Powell's dissent was
never published. In the course of my research for the government's brief in O'Hagan, I
uncovered Justice Powell's draft in the collection of Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers
housed at the Library of Congress. Justice Powell's draft is attached as an appendix to this
Article. See Draft of Dissent from Denial of Certiorari for Carpenter v. United States,
Justice Powell (Dec. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Powell's Draft] (reprinted at Appendix)
[Editor's Note: Pincites to Powell's Draft correspond to the page numbers on the original
document.]. Justice Powell dissented from the initial denial of certiorari, but after a
revote, certiorari was granted. See United States v. Carpenter, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986).
12 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
13 See Powell's Draft, supra note 11, at 4-5.
14 See United States v. Carpenter, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986).
1 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24 (noting that the Court was evenly divided with respect
to the convictions under the securities laws).
16 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1997) (holding that a person
who trades in securities for profit, using confidential information misappropriated in
[Vol. 78:13
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of the post-Carpenter cases that reject the misappropriation theory, and an
analysis of the Court's recent acceptance of that theory in O'Hagan.
Part III evaluates the misappropriation theory's support in the common
law and its utility in serving the policy goals underlying prohibitions against
insider trading. In addition, Part III analyzes the relationship between mis-
appropriation theory and the classical theory. In her opinion for the Court in
O'Hagan, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the misappropriation the-
ory as "complementary" to the classical theory.17 While the two theories are
complementary in the sense that they "each address[ ] efforts to capitalize on
non-public information through the purchase or sale of securities,"' 8 the mis-
appropriation theory encompasses almost all of the conduct proscribed by the
classical theory, 19 and more.
Despite its breadth, the misappropriation theory is in many ways more
consistent with the common law than Powell's classical theory. The two
theories draw on different sets of common law principles: the classical theory
draws heavily on the common law of deceit, whereas the misappropriation
theory draws primarily on the common law of agency. Agency law provides
a more comprehensive and coherent basis for dealing with the problem of
insider trading, which is, at bottom, the misuse by faithless agents of infor-
mation that belongs to others. Moreover, the misappropriation theory's
broad scope allows it to fill a gap left by the classical theory which, if left
unfilled, would severely undermine the policy interests served by prohibi-
tions against insider trading. The misappropriation theory, as adopted in
O'Hagan, secures the law of insider trading to firmer foundations.
breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violating
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
17 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
18 Id.
19 In some areas the classical theory may reach more broadly. The classical theory pro-
scribes insider trading while "in possession of" confidential information. See SEC v.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (noting that the scienter element of
§ 10(b) "is satisfied if at the time defendant purchased stock he had actual knowledge of
undisclosed material information, knew it was undisclosed, and knew it was material").
Misappropriation requires that the misappropriator "use the information to purchase or sell
securities." O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (emphasis added). Very little, however, may
turn on this distinction. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119-21 (2d Cir.
1983) (stating, in dictum, that because a possessor of inside information cannot help but
"use" it, proof of possession of inside information is sufficient). The other significant
distinction between the two theories is that the misappropriation theory is subject to con-
tractual waiver by the owner of the information, while the classical theory is not. See in-
fra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (noting that misappropriation theory does not ap-
ply if insiders trade with the approval of their principal, the owner of the information).
19981
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I. THE CLASSICAL THEORY: CHIARELLA AND DIRKS
A. United States v. Chiarella: Requirement of a Duty of Disclosure to
Shareholders
Vincent Chiarella was a "markup man" for a New York financial
printer.20 In the course of his work on announcements for corporate take-
over bids, he deduced the identity of the target companies and used the in-
formation to trade in the securities of the target companies, realizing a gain
of slightly more than $30,000.21 His trading violated his employer's clearly
established policy against the use of customer information for personal
gain.22
Chiarella's trading triggered an investigation by the SEC, leading to a
criminal securities fraud conviction under § 10(b) that was affirmed by the
Second Circuit. 23 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, re-
versed. 24 Justice Powell framed the question presented as whether Chi-
arella's silence could be deemed deceptive. 25 Relying on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Powell reasoned that:
At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing
reliance upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who falls to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction
commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to
disclose arises when one party has information "that the other [party] is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between them. 26
Powell incorporated this common law approach into § 10(b). 27 He found
20 Chiarella's duties included the selection of type fonts and page layouts. See United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing Chiarella's duties as a
"markup man"), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (explaining that although the names of the companies
were concealed, Chiarella deduced these names from other information in the documents
and traded in the securities of the target company to gain $30,000 in 14 months).
22 See Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369 (noting that the employer's rules were posted on
bulletin boards throughout the office and described the prohibited conduct and the potential
criminal consequences).
23 See id. at 1373.
24 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237.
25 See id. at 226 ("[Section] 10(b) does not state whether silence may constitute a ma-
nipulative or deceptive device.").
26 Id. at 227-28 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). The
general common law rule is well established that silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
fraudulent. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 193 (1817) (holding that fail-
ure to disclose end of the War of 1812-which caused price of tobacco to increase-was
not fraud in purchase of tobacco).
27 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 ("[S]ilence in connection with the purchase or sale of
[Vol. 78:13
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that the common law of deceit recognized "a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corpo-
ration." 2 In Chiarella's case, the jury was not instructed to find any such
specific duty; rather, the jury instruction implied that Chiarella owed a "duty
to everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury simply
was told to decide whether petitioner used material, non-public information
at a time when 'he knew other people trading in the securities market did not
have access to the same information.' "29 Powell rejected the notion that
Congress intended § 10(b) to function as a "parity-of-information rule" pro-
hibiting any informational advantages in the securities markets. 30 To this
end, Powell looked to the common law of deceit to confine § 10(b); that
body of law did not support a sweeping duty to all market participants:
[The element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-
is absent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship
with the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no
prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduci-
ary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions. 31
Because Chiarella had breached no duty of disclosure to the sellers of the se-
curities, his silence could not be fraudulent, and therefore, his conviction
could not stand.
Powell declined to decide-on the ground that it had not been submitted to
the jury-the merits of the government's alternative theory. That alternative
theory argued that Chiarella had breached a duty to the acquiring corporation
when he traded information that he obtained in his position as an employee
of the printer employed by the corporation. 32
securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) .... But such liability is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween parties to a transaction.").
28 Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
29 Id. at 231 (citation omitted).
30 Id. at 233.
31 Id. at 232-33.
32 See id. at 235-36. Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. See id. at 239-40
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "a person who has misappropriated non-public in-
formation has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading").
He believed that the jury had been adequately instructed on this theory, see id. at 243-44,
and that any deficiency in the instruction was harmless error, see id. at 245. Chief Justice
Burger's views are discussed in greater detail in Part II. See infra notes 109-14 and ac-
companying text (discussing Justice Burger's acceptance of the misappropriation theory in
his dissenting opinion in Chiarella).
19981
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B. SEC v. Dirks: Duty Acquired as a Tippee
Ray Dirks was an investment analyst for a New York broker-dealer whose
research focused on the securities of insurance companies. 33 Ronald Secrist,
a former officer of Equity Funding of America, told Dirks that Equity
Funding was carrying on a massive fraud by grossly overstating the value of
its assets and urged Dirks to bring the fraud to light. 34 Dirks's investigation
confirmed Secrist's allegations. Dirks shared this information with the Wall
Street Journal,35 the SEC,36 and his clients, who proceeded to unload their
more than $16 million in Equity Funding securities. 37  Dirks's clients
avoided massive losses by selling in advance of the public disclosure of the
Equity Funding fraud.
38
After the fraud was disclosed, the SEC began an investigation into Dirks's
role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud, leading to the filing of an ad-
ministrative complaint against him. 39 The SEC found that Dirks had aided
and abetted insider trading violations by passing on information about the
Equity Funding fraud to his clients. 4° Conceding that Dirks had played an
important role in bringing the fraud to light, however, the SEC imposed only
a censure on him. 41 Dirks appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the SEC's censure.42 The Supreme Court granted Dirks's
petition for certiorari, 43 and reversed. 44
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell strongly suggested that he viewed
the SEC's censure of Dirks as overreaching by the agency. 45 Once again,
Powell rejected what he perceived to be the SEC's view that "the antifraud
33 See SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983).
3 See id. at 649.
35 See id. at 649-50 (noting that William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal bureau chief
who Dirks contacted, doubted "that such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined
to write the story").
36 See id. at 650 n.3 (noting that the SEC was currently conducting its own investiga-
tion of Equity Funding).
37 See id. at 649.
38 See id. at 650 (noting that the price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share
to $15 per share).
39 See id.
40 See id. at 650-51 (finding that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5).
I' See id. at 651-52.
42 See SEC v. Dirks, 681 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
43 See SEC v. Dirks, 459 U.S. 1014, 1014 (1982).
I See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652.
41 See id. at 664 n.24 ("Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely
on the reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the
facts of this case make plain.").
[Vol. 78:13
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provisions require equal information among all traders. "4 He reiterated that
"'[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties... and
not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position
in the market. '"47 Nevertheless, Powell recognized that there was a "need
for a ban on some tippee trading . ,"48 Looking to the Court's prior deci-
sions for the limits of such trading, Powell found that limit in common law
principles involving a fiduciary's breach of duty, noting that "the transac-
tions of those who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach
are 'as forbidden' as transactions 'on behalf of the trustee himself. "49 The
absence of such a rule would "'open up opportunities for devious dealings in
the name of the others that the trustee could not conduct in his own. "50 But
Powell also recognized that imposing a broad-based duty to the market on
tippees such as Dirks could have a chilling effect on the process by which
information makes its way to the market:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person know-
ingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades
on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts,
which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and ana-
lyze information," and this is often done by meeting with and question-
ing corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information
that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to
the market worth of a corporation's securities.5
Balancing these factors, Powell concluded that a tippee's duty to disclose de-
rives from an insider's fiduciary duty of disclosure, which would be
breached only when the insider has improperly provided that inside informa-
tion to the tippee.
52
Not all disclosures of corporate information are considered improper. A
corporate official, for example, might mistakenly believe that the information
was already public or not material.5 3 The test of whether a disclosure is im-
proper is "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of
duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no deriva-
46 Id. at 657.
47 Id. at 657-58 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 231-32 n.14
(1980)).
48 Id. at 659.
49 Id. (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951) (holding trustee personally
liable for authorizing employee to trade in securities of the debtors' subsidiaries)).
50 Id. (quoting Mosser, 341 U.S. at 271).
51 Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted).
52 See id. at 659-60.
s3 See id. at 662.
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 78 B. U. L. Rev. 21 1998
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tive breach. "54 Secrist, the source of Dirks's information, was motivated to
expose the fraud and had obtained no personal advantage by disclosing it to
Dirks. 55 Because Secrist had violated no duty to Equity Funding's share-
holders, Dirks could not be derivatively liable.56 Thus, Dirks confirmed
Chiarella's holding that insider trading liability-consistent with the common
law of deceit-must be based on a breach of duty to the purchasers or sellers
of the corporation's shares.
57
C. Puzzles of the Classical Theory
Justice Powell's efforts to limit the law of insider trading by incorporating
the common law of deceit into § 10(b) of the Exchange Act create a series of
doctrinal problems and unresolved issues. This Part explores those problems
and questions.
1. No Reliance in Open-Market Transactions
The first and most notable problem is that the common law of deceit pro-
vides scant support for the proposition that a corporate insider defrauds a
shareholder when the insider does not engage in a face-to-face transaction,
but instead trades in an impersonal market on the basis of confidential infor-
mation.58 In the leading case of Goodwin v. Agassiz,59 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts rejected a claim that an insider commits fraud when
trading over a stock exchange. 6° The plaintiff-shareholder sold his shares in
a mining company to two of the company's insiders, its president and general
4 Id.
55 See id. at 666-67.
56 See id. at 667 (holding that Dirks "could not have been 'a participant after the fact in
[an] insider breach of a fiduciary duty'" (citation omitted)). In dissent, Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, disagreed that personal gain by the insider was
required for a breach of duty. See id. at 673-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (arguing that personal gain is not an element of the breach of the duty because the
duty does not look to the insiders' motives, but rather to the insiders' actions and the con-
sequences to shareholders).
51 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing Powell's opinion in Chi-
arella, which required that a tippee breach a duty that the tippee has with the sharehold-
ers).
59 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1153 n.296 (1996) ("Research has
not disclosed any case in which a stockholder selling in the market has successfully in-
voked fiduciary disclosure duty, as opposed to Rule lOb-5, to recover compensatory dam-
ages from a director who concurrently bought stock.").
59 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
60 See id. at 661 (explaining the impracticability of requiring directors and other insid-
ers who buy or sell shares of their corporation to seek out the other transacting party and
disclosing to him everything that a court or jury may later find to affect the value of such
shares).
[Vol. 78:13
HeinOnline  -- 78 B. U. L. Rev. 22 1998
JUSTICE POWELL'S INSIDER TRADING LEGACY
manager. 6' The insiders were also directors. 62 The insiders were aware of a
geologist's theory that the land owned by the company might contain valu-
able copper deposits.63 They kept this information secret, however, in order
to obtain options on surrounding land that might also contain copper.
64
Knowing that the company's stock price would rise if the theory panned out,
the insiders bought heavily in the company's shares. 65 These purchases,
done over the Boston Stock Exchange, were completely anonymous.
66
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim of fraud. 67 While the court recog-
nized that the directors of a corporation "stand in a relation of trust to the
corporation and are bound to exercise the strictest good faith in respect to its
property and business," 68 it held that directors do not "occupy the position of
trustee toward individual stockholders." 69 Thus, there was "'no fiduciary
relation between them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of his
stock.'" 70 This result was supported by the "imposing weight of authority in
other jurisdictions. "71 The court acknowledged that the result might have
been different in a face-to-face transaction, but concluded that any such duty
to shareholders did not carry over to an anonymous exchange transaction.
72
Goodwin sets forth the "majority rule," which holds that there can be no
liability for insider trading carried out over an exchange. 73 Even before pas-
61 See id. at 659 (discussing the transactions in question in which the defendants,
through brokers, bought 700 shares from plaintiff).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 659-60 (noting that the plaintiff did not have this information).
64 See id. at 660 (noting that the defendants agreed that the theory should be disclosed
only if absolutely necessary).
65 See id. (noting that the defendants bought many shares of the stock through agents).
66 See id. (discussing the plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding the defendants' iden-




70 Id. (citations omitted).
71 Id. (citing cases from Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Utah).
72 See id. at 661 (discussing, in dictum, that had the transaction been face-to-face, relief
may have been granted in appropriate circumstances).
73 See Barbara A. Ash, State Regulation of Insider Trading-A Timely Resurgence?, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 399 (1988) ("Under what has been referred to as the 'majority rule,'
an officer or director owed no duty to disclose any information even when the trading
transaction was with an existing shareholder."); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty,
Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (noting that at the time
the "Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act were passed, classic insider trading-
transactions between uninformed shareholders and corporate officials possessing inside
information-was not regarded as fraudulent in most jurisdictions" and that "[t]he corpo-
rate official's fiduciary duties were considered to run to the corporation as an entity, not to
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sage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, a minority of courts
had adopted an exception to the majority rule, known as the "special facts"
doctrine. 74 Under that exception, a corporate officer or director has a duty
to disclose in a face-to-face transaction with a shareholder if there are special
facts that would make nondisclosure unconscionable. 75
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the "special facts" doctrine
in Strong v. Repide.76 In Strong, the managing director of a land develop-
ment company was negotiating the sale of the company's land, its only valu-
able asset, when he arranged to purchase Mrs. Strong's shares from her
agent. 77 The -managing director, rather than simply going from his own of-
fice to the agent's office next door, took elaborate steps to conceal his iden-
tity. 78 He employed his own agent, who in turn employed a broker "who
had an office some distance away," to approach the plaintiff's agent con-
cerning the purchase of her stock. 79 The managing director continued the
concealment by paying for the shares with the check of a third person.80 The
Supreme Court concluded from these facts that:
[T]he concealment of identity was not a mere inadvertent omission, an
omission without any fraudulent or deceitful intent, but was a studied
and intentional omission to be characterized as part of the deceitful
machinations to obtain the purchase without giving any information
whatever as to the state and probable result of the negotiations, to the
vendor of the stock, and to in that way obtain the same at a lower
price.8 '
Based on this finding of deceitful concealment, the Court granted rescission
individual shareholders"). Although Goodwin is often described as following the
"majority" rule, it is worth noting that few courts had addressed the issue at the time
Goodwin was decided.
74 See, e.g., Todd A. Bauman, Comment, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 838, 853 (1984) (noting that "the traditional common law rule allowed insider
trading in anonymous markets, while regulating such activity in face-to-face transactions in
shares of closely held corporations").
'1 See Ash, supra note 73, at 399-400.
76 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (holding that there was a legal obligation to make the dis-
closures because of the special facts).
77 See id. at 425 (noting that the defendant knowingly purchased 800 shares from Mrs.
Strong's agent). The Court stated that "[i]f the sale should not be consummated ... the
defendant also knew that the value of thelands and of the shares in the company would be
almost nothing." Id. at 424-25. Apparently, the government had failed to provide any
protection to the lands, thus r6ndering it essentially worthless. See id. at 425.
78 See id. (describing the scheme the defendant followed in order to purchase the
shares).
79 Id.
80 See id. at 433.
81 Id.
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to Mrs. Strong.82
The special facts doctrine of Strong is readily distinguished from the trans-
actions over impersonal exchanges at issue in Goodwin, Chiarella, and
Dirks. The "special facts" found by the Court in Strong indicate that active
concealment of the defendant's identity deprived the plaintiff-shareholder of
a basis for inquiring about the transaction and the company's prospects.83 In
an impersonal exchange market, by contrast, the insider need not conceal his
identity from the outsider on the other side of the transaction because there is
no individual matching of trades in the securities markets.84 An insider
makes no investment in concealment, and an outsider has no expectation of
receiving any disclosure from the insider because the outsider does not know
that she is trading with an insider. The identity of the person on the other
side of the transaction is a mere fortuity, irrelevant to the shareholder's deci-
sion to sell.85 Because of this anonymity in exchange markets, there can be
no reliance on the insider's duty to disclose, and the insider cannot be said to
have induced the trade.
8 6
82 See id. at 435.
83 See id. at 433 (noting that by concealing his identity, the defendant could "more eas-
ily avoid any questions relative to the negotiations for the sale of the lands and their prob-
able result, and could also avoid any actual misrepresentations on that subject, which he
evidently thought were necessary in his case to constitute a fraud"). Professor Keeton de-
scribes Strong as a case involving concealed identity. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud-
Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 26 (1936) ("[I]t has been held to
constitute fraud for a director to conceal his identity along with another fact which makes
the stock of much greater worth, and which the stockholder would probably have discov-
ered, either by investigation or inquiry, if he had known that the purchaser was a direc-
tor." (citing Strong, 213 U.S. at 431)). Keeton notes that "these cases often distinguish
between facts which could be discovered by an inspection of the books and facts which are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the director." Id.
8 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and
the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 775, 799 (1988) (arguing that "the existence of national securities markets makes the
use of agents unnecessary, since the anonymity of the markets is sufficient to conceal the
fact that insiders are trading in a manner analogous to that accomplished through the use of
agents").
85 See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1982) (arguing that investors don't know
nor do they care "who their buyers or sellers are, there is no bargaining similar to that in
face-to-face transactions" and that "given the essential independence of buyer and seller
decisions, causation and injury are difficult to trace").
86 See Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 341, 366-67 (1982) ("Silence by a fiduciary is fraudulent primarily because the bene-
ficiary is likely to interpret that silence in a face-to-face transaction as meaning that the
fiduciary is aware of no additional material information."). The government is not re-
quired, however, to prove reliance to establish a claim of securities fraud because the gov-
ernment was not a party to the transaction. See SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th
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From a doctrinal perspective, Powell's invocation in Chiarella of the
common law of deceit is strained. The majority rule is that there can be no
liability for insider trading carried out over a stock exchange. The logic of
the "special facts" exception to that rule, while protecting face-to-face trans-
actions, cannot be stretched to encompass transactions over exchanges.87 As
Michael Dooley observes, "insider trading in no way resembles deceit. No
representation is made, nor is there any reliance, change of position, or
causal connection between the defendant's act and the plaintiffs losses."
88
For these reasons, the common law of deceit does not support the proposi-
tion that a corporate insider defrauds a shareholder when trading in an im-
personal market on the basis of confidential information.
2. No Fiduciary Duty to Prospective Shareholders
Another doctrinal problem with the classical theory is that the fiduciary
obligation of corporate officers and directors generally extends only to cur-
rent shareholders.89 That obligation does not extend to prospective share-
holders who may purchase their shares for the first time when an insider
sells. 90 The classical theory fails to account adequately for this inconsistency
with the common law. The Court's only response to this problem was set
forth in Chiarella, in which the Court quoted Judge Learned Hand:
[T]he director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the
very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the ad-
vantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a benefi-
ciary although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become
one. 9
1
Although this distinction may be "sorry," it is the common law rule. 92 Pow-
Cir. 1985) (holding that the Commission is not required to prove reliance on the misrepre-
sentations or that the misrepresentations caused damages).
87 See Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 38 (1986).
88 Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
59 (1980). Although Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), holds
that reliance can be presumed in the case of a fraudulent omission, that case involved non-
disclosure by fiduciaries in a face-to-face transaction. As such, the case is indistinguish-
able from Strong v. Repide, but readily distinguished from Chiarella and Dirks.
89 See 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 740, 743 (1992) (providing the unreported case Marhart,
Inc. v. Calmat Co. (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 1992)) ("[F]iduciary duties run to stockholders, not
prospective stockholders.").
90 See id.
91 United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)).
92 See Anderson, supra note 86, at 356 (noting that "under state law corporate officers
and directors generally have a fiduciary obligation to existing shareholders but not to pro-
spective shareholders").
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eli's reliance on the common law of deceit is, at best, selective.
3. Transformation of a Breach of a Tipper's Duty of Confidentiality Into
a Breach by the Tippee of a Duty of Disclosure to Shareholders
Additional problems with the classical theory are raised by the tension
between Dirks and Chiarella. In Chiarella, Powell treats insider trading as a
breach of a duty of disclosure to the shareholders, 93 but the tipper's breach is
more readily seen as a breach of his duty of confidentiality owed to the cor-
poration. 94  Although Powell's justification of the need for prohibitions
against trading by tippees makes sense, his transformation of the tipper's
breach of his duty of confidentiality owed to the corporation into a breach by
the tippee of a duty of disclosure to shareholders is harder to accept. 95
4. Causation
The classical theory also poses puzzles of causation. The "victim" of in-
sider trading would likely have sold her shares regardless of whether or not
the insider entered the market to purchase them. 96 Moreover, identifying the
"victim" of insider trading is problematic due to the near impossibility of
matching trades in an impersonal market. 97 Congress has addressed this
tracing problem by allowing all contemporaneous traders to sue insider trad-
ers. 98 Their damages are limited, however, to the insider's profit gained or
93 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 ("[A] corporate insider must abstain from trading in
the shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside information
known to him.").
94 See Mitchell, supra note 84, at 796 (noting that at common law, corporate directors
owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and that only a few jurisdictions recognize a fidu-
ciary duty to shareholders with respect to purchases of company stock).
95 I am indebted to Steve Thel for the argument presented here.
96 See Cox & Fogarty, supra note 73, at 359 (arguing that a purchaser "is rarely the
person whose intermediary meets the insider's intermediary on the exchange floor" and
that "[t]he latter person was already in the market and probably would have bought or sold
even if the insider had abstained"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 324
("[The shareholder] who sold to Chiarella, might well have sold no matter what Chiarella
did. There is no reason to think that Chiarella's 'buy' order, placed through a broker,
caused additional investors to sell.").
97 See Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Eco-
nomic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223, 238 (1992) (stating that
"it is virtually impossible for a private plaintiff trading in the stock exchange to establish
either privity with a particular defendant or causality of the trade by any trader's particular
transaction").
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994). The statute states that:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling information shall be liable in action in any court
of competent jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or
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loss avoided, and the damages are offset by any disgorgement paid to the
SEC. 99 The limitations on this statutory remedy suggest that Congress in-
tended to deprive the insider of his gains rather than to compensate the
"victims" of insider trading for their losses. 100
5. No Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders
Another problem with the classical theory is that the common law also
does not recognize a fiduciary duty running from officers and directors to
bondholders, at least while the corporation is solvent. 101 Therefore, the clas-
sical theory does not prevent insider trading in bonds. The failure to prevent
insider trading in bonds is a large loophole in the classical theory. 102
6. The Corporation's Property Rights in Information
Powell's efforts to ground the classical theory of insider trading in the
common law of deceit ignore the corporation's interest in protecting its prop-
erty rights in information. In Dirks, Powell distinguished "[t]he duty that
insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside infor-
mation... from the common-law duty that officers and directors also have
to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confi-
dential information is one." 103 As discussed above, that duty of disclosure to
shareholders is not well grounded in the common law of deceit. Nor is it
grounded in the law of property, because the corporation's confidences be-
long to the corporation, not the shareholders. 104 Consequently, the insider's
sale of securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased... or sold...
securities of the same class.
Id.
99 See id. § 78t-l(b)(l)-(2). The statute states that:
The total amount of damages... shall not exceed the profit gained or loss
avoided in the transactions that are the subject of the violation .... The total amount
of damages imposed against any person.., shall be diminished by the amounts, if
any, that such person may be required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order obtained
at the instance of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.
Id.
100 Cf. Salbu, supra note 97, at 236 (arguing that the "proper justification for the
granting of surrogate status to contemporaneous traders is to achieve l0b-5's goal of deter-
rence").
101 See A.C. Pritchard, O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC: Imputation of Fraud and Optimal
Monitoring, 4 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 179, 188-89 (1995).
102 See R. Rene Pengra, Note, Insider Trading, Debt Securities, and Rule 10b-5:
Evaluating the Fiduciary Relationship, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1354, 1366 (1996) (arguing for
Rule lOb-5 liability for insider trading in debt securities).
103 SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983).
104 See Dooley, supra note 88, at 32 ("Neither insiders nor outside investors have any
property right in non-public corporate information. The corporate principal owns the in-
formation and may withhold it so long as withholding serves a valid corporate purpose.").
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duty to protect the confidentiality of the corporation's information is much
better established, 10 5 and the corporation has a better claim than the share-
holder that its rights have been infringed by the insider trading1 ° 6 The
breach of this duty of confidentiality has given rise to liability to the corpo-
ration under state corporate law. 1°7 But given the restrictions on purchasers
or sellers that the Court has put on the private right of action under §
10(b), 10 8 the corporation will have a difficult time collecting under the secu-
rities laws for the misuse of its information.
In sum, the classical theory of insider trading grounded in the law of de-
ceit gives incomplete protection to the integrity of the market because it only
addresses breaches of duty to shareholders. This gap was the driving force
behind the development of the misappropriation theory. The next Part ex-
amines the development of that theory.
105 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (stating that an agent is under
"a duty ... not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the
principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in viola-
tion of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the principal").
106 See Dooley, supra note 88, at 21 (arguing that requiring insiders to forfeit any profit
resulting from a breach of a fiduciary duty should result in payment to the issuer because it
has the superior property interest in the information); see also Easterbrook, supra note 96,
at 323 ("Chiarella's trading ... reduced the returns available to the bidders. His trading
may have alerted the market to the impending offers and so made them more difficult to
consummate. Chiarella's conduct subjected his principals to uncompensated risk.").
101 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 916 (N.Y. 1969) (requiring that offi-
cers and directors account to the corporation for profits made in trading on inside infor-
mation); cf. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (requiring that cor-
porate officers account for trading profits made in competition with the corporation's
planned repurchase of its shares). But see Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 187 (7th Cir.
1978) (rejecting duty to corporation under Indiana law).
Section 16(b) also puts recovery for short-swing profits by insiders in the hands of the
corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994) (requiring that any profit derived from the pur-
chase or sale of a security by an insider within six months is to be recoverable by the is-
suer).
108 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (holding
that a private right of action is limited to persons who purchased or sold securities). The
purchaser/seller limitation is inapplicable to SEC enforcement actions and' to criminal
cases. See id. at 751 n.14 (holding that the purchaser-seller rule "imposes no limitation on
the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief"); see also Holmes v. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 281 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("[The purchaser/seller standing requirement for
private civil actions under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is of no import in criminal prosecutions
for willful violations of those provisions.").
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 78 B. U. L. Rev. 29 1998
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
II. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY: CARPENTER AND O'HAGAN
A. Background of the Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory has its judicial genesis in Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent in Chiarella.1°9 The Chief Justice agreed with Justice Powell
that, "[a]s a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transac-
tion has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the paities
stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation." 110 Burger parted company
with Powell, however, where a trader obtained a trading advantage based on
information that had been "misappropriated. "1I In Burger's view, "a person
who has misappropriated non-public information has an absolute duty to dis-
close that information or to refrain from trading." 112 Burger argued that im-
posing such a duty would not have any negative effect on legitimate business
practices because the misappropriator's "conduct quite clearly serves no use-
ful function except his own enrichment at the expense of others. "113 Bur-
ger's theory, while much broader than Powell's, shared one feature with the
majority opinion in Chiarella: the duty endorsed by Burger was owed to the
109 See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(reasoning that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading"). Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Marshall also indicated support for the theory or the broader parity of informa-
tion theory. See id. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "a person violates §
10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his benefit nonpublic information
which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities"); id. at 245
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.) (stating agreement "with much of what
is said in ... the dissenting opinion" of the Chief Justice).
110 Id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 106
(2d ed. 1955)).
"I See id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the rule should give way
when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or in-
dustry, but by some unlawful means").
112 Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Keeton, supra note 83, at 25-26). Keeton of-
fers scant authority for this proposition, asserting that "[a]ny time information is acquired
by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to disclose that information, ir-
respective of the nature of the remedy." Keeton, supra note 85, at 25-26; see also id. at
35 (stating that a duty of disclosure exists when information is acquired by an illegal act).
But the only authorities offered by Keeton are cases seeking specific performance. See id.
at 25 ("There are cases denying the remedy of specific performance in instances where
material information undisclosed has been acquired by a tortious act."). These cases de-
nying specific performance are, of course, grounded in the equity doctrine of "unclean
hands," which would not apply in an action at law. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (discussing the eq-
uitable notion of "unclean hands," which prohibits relief to those "tainted with inequita-
bleness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief").
113 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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shareholder on the other side of the trade. 114
Prosecutors quickly embraced a variant of the misappropriation theory es-
poused by Burger. In United States v. Newman, 15 they charged that New-
man, a securities trader, and two investment bankers, one from Morgan
Stanley and one from Kuhn Loeb, "misappropriated confidential information
concerning proposed mergers and acquisitions that was entrusted to their em-
ployers by corporate clients."116 Rather than alleging a breach of duty to the
shareholders with whom the conspirators traded, however, the indictment
alleged that the conspirators had breached their duties of trust and confidence
to their employers, the investment banks, and to their employers' corporate
clients. 1
17
The Second Circuit agreed that this breach of duty stated a violation of §
10(b). 118 The court brushed aside objections that the investment banks were
not purchasers or sellers as being inapplicable to a government action. 119 It
found the requisite deception in the conspirators' conduct that damaged the
investment banks' reputations as keepers of client confidences and in
wronging the investment banks' clients. 120 The court also rejected the claim
that the conspirators' fraud was not "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of securities, reasoning that the defendant's sole purpose in misappropriating
the takeover information was to purchase shares of the target companies.121
Newman illustrates that from its earliest acceptance by the courts, the misap-
propriation theory, unlike the classical theory, was premised upon a fraud
committed on one party, and a securities transaction entered into with an-
other.
B. United States v. Carpenter: Misappropriation Theory in Limbo
The Second Circuit subsequently reaffirmed the misappropriation the-
114 See id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that one who misappropriates non-
public information has an absolute duty to disclose that information to the shareholder on
the other side of the transaction or to refrain from trading). Purchasers who have inside
information from their own company generally have no duty to shareholders of other cor-
porations. See General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968)
("We know of no rule of law.., that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and
had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances
that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale.").
'1 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
116 Id. at 15.
117 See id. at 15-16.
118 See id. at 16.
119 See id. at 16-17 (arguing that Rule lob-5 applies to any person, and that the court
must be concerned with the scope of the Rule and not the plaintiffs standing to sue).
12 See id. at 17 (noting that the clients had takeover plans that depended upon market-
based prices, not inflated prices caused by the release of this information).
121 See id. at 18.
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 78 B. U. L. Rev. 31 1998
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ory. 122 The Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider the misappropria-
tion theory was presented in another Second Circuit case, United States v.
Carpenter.123 Carpenter narrowly avoided a decision on the validity of the
theory-a decision which, but for a quirk of fate, in all likelihood would
have changed the course of insider trading jurisprudence.
Carpenter arose from a unique set of facts. Defendant R. Foster Winans
was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal and one of the writers of the
"Heard on the Street" column, while defendant David Carpenter was a news
clerk at the Journal.124 Defendant Kenneth Felis was a stockbroker at Kid-
der Peabody. 125 Winans would pass securities-related information scheduled
to appear in the next day's column through Carpenter to Felis, who would
then, depending upon the tenor of the article, buy or sell the subject securi-
ties.126 Wall Street Journal policy deemed all news information to be com-
pany property and required nonpublic information to be treated as confiden-
tial. 127 Ignoring this policy, the conspirators netted nearly $690,000 from
the scheme. 128 The stress of an SEC inquiry into the scheme caused the con-
spirators to turn on each other, 129 and an indictment followed.
The Second Circuit affirmed the conspirators' convictions for mail fraud,
wire fraud, and securities fraud.130 With respect to the securities fraud con-
victions, the Second Circuit followed its earlier precedents and upheld the
convictions under the misappropriation theory.' 31 The Second Circuit re-
jected the argument that the misappropriation theory did not apply because
the victim of the misappropriation was the Wall Street Journal and not the
companies whose shares were traded. 132
The conspirators petitioned for certiorari, which the Court initially voted
to deny.133 Justice Powell prepared a draft dissent from the denial of certio-
rari in which he made it clear that he would have rejected the misappropria-
tion theory altogether. 134 He began his opinion by noting that "the Second
Circuit has resolved an important question of securities law in a way that ap-
'2 See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that misappropria-
tion of nonpublic information constitutes a violation of § 10(b)).
'2 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aft'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).




12' See id. at 1027.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 1036.
131 See id. at 1034-35.-
132 See id. at 1032-34.
133 See Powell's Draft, supra note 11, at 1 (dissenting from denial of certiorari).
13 See id. at 6 (arguing that the misappropriation theory has "little or no support... in
the language or history of the Securities Act of 1934").
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pears to conflict with recent opinions of this Court."135 The first of these
opinions was Powell's own work in Chiarella.
In Chiarella, the analysis of Rule lOb-5 began with the proposition that:
[P]arties to a business transaction generally do not have an affirmative
duty to disclose information about the transaction. The court noted,
however, that a failure to disclose material information could be
fraudulent in certain circumstances. "But such liability is premised
upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between parties to a transaction." 136
Powell's reading of Chiarella is closely tied to the common law of deceit,
which requires that "[o]ne party to a business transaction is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is con-
summated ... matters known to him that the other is entitled to know be-
cause of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them."137 Thus, the common law of deceit requires that the duty of disclo-
sure be owed by one party of the transaction to the other. In Powell's view,
Chiarella had incorporated this common law requirement into § 10(b). 138
Powell then turned to Dirks, which "established that when outsiders have a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they cannot purchase securities fiom those
shareholders without first informing them of material information that might
influence the decision to purchase or sell the securities."139 Again, the dis-
closure duty was only between the parties to the securities transaction. By
contrast, in Carpenter there was no fiduciary relationship between the defen-
dants and those from whom they purchased securities.140 The only fiduciary
relationship at issue was Winans' duty to the Journal.141 Powell noted, how-
ever, that previous cases under Rule lOb-5 did not support the proposition
that the fiduciary duty an individual owes to his employee was sufficient to
support an action under Rule lOb-5.142 Rather, the inquiry under Rule lOb-5
"must focus on the petitioner's relationship with the sellers of ... securi-
ties."143 Because there was no such relationship in Carpenter, Powell con-
cluded that the petitioners' conduct did not violate § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.144
135 Id. at 1.
136 Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
138 See Powell's Draft, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that Chiarella found that parties to
a business transaction do not necessarily owe a duty to disclose information and that liabil-
ity arises only in instances where there is such a duty).
139 Id.
11o See id. (noting that the court of appeals found no fiduciary relationship between any
of the parties).
141 See id. at 4-5.
142 See id. at 6.
143 Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
144 See id. (concluding that because there was no fiduciary duty to disclose information,
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Powell's draft dissent was joined by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. 145 It was never published, however, because Justices Brennan
and Scalia changed their votes to grant certiorari.146 Before Carpenter was
argued, Justice Powell retired.147 His successor, Anthony Kennedy, was not
confirmed until after the argument.148 The Court split 4-4 on the misappro-
priation theory under the securities laws and it issued no opinion on the va-
lidity of the theory.149 Given Powell's explicit rejection of the misappropria-
tion theory in his draft dissent, it is reasonable to conclude that if Justice
Powell had not retired when he did, the Supreme Court would have rejected
the misappropriation theory in 1987.150
C. United States v. Bryan: The Fourth Circuit Rejects the Misappropriation
Theory
In the aftermath of Carpenter, Congress considered, but declined to adopt,
a proposal to codify the misappropriation theory.' 5 ' Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment continued to bring misappropriation cases, and the theory was ac-
their convictions under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 could not be sustained). Powell reiterated
the point in his conclusion. See id. ("There appears to be little or no support for the deci-
sion below in the language or the history of the Securities Act of 1934.").
14s See Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Powell, (Dec. 11, 1986) (on file
with the author) (joining in dissent from denial of certiorari); Letter from Justice
O'Connor to Justice Powell, (Dec. 11, 1986) (on file with the author) (joining in dissent
from denial of certiorari).
146 See Bench Memorandum, Carpenter v. United States (No. 86-422) (Oct. 7, 1987)
(copy on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 427 of Thurgood
Marshall Papers). Certiorari was granted on December 15, 1986. See United States v.
Carpenter, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986).
147 See Al Kamen, Justice Powell Resigns, Was Supreme Court's Pivotal Vote, WASH.
PosT, June 27, 1987, at Al (reporting that Justice Powell retired on June 26, 1987).
148 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 19 (1987) (noting that the case was
argued on October 7, 1987); Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Anthony Kennedy to
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at Al (reporting that Justice Kennedy was
nominated November 11, 1987); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Kennedy Sworn In as 104th Justice on
High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1988, at A10 (reporting that Anthony Kennedy was
sworn in as Justice on February 18, 1988).
149 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. The Court affirmed the mail and wire fraud convic-
tions unanimously. See id.
150 Conversely, if Justice Kennedy had been nominated and confirmed by the time of
argument, the misappropriation theory might well have been upheld, given that Justice
Kennedy voted with the majority in O'Hagan. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct.
2199, 2204 (1997) (noting that Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined in
Ginsburg's opinion).
15 See Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAw. 145, 150-51 (1989) (discussing the debate over
the move to define insider trading and the decision against such definition).
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cepted by the Seventh 152 and Ninth Circuits. 153 The government's string of
victories came to an abrupt halt in 1995, when the Fourth Circuit rejected the
misappropriation theory in United States v. Bryan. 1
54
Elton "Butch" Bryan, Lottery Director for the State of West Virginia, 55
was convicted of wire and securities fraud for trading in the securities of
companies that were about to be awarded contracts with the lottery.156 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit framed the question before it as:
[W]hether [Rule lOb-5]'s prohibition of "fraud" "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," which can be read no more broadly
than the statutory prohibition of "deception" "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," may extend to breaches of fiduciary
duty involving the misappropriation of confidential information from
one who is neither a purchaser nor seller of securities, or otherwise
connected with a securities transaction.1
57
The Fourth Circuit' found that the misappropriation theory failed to meet the
statutory requirements on two grounds. First, the court held that the misap-
propriation theory imposes liability upon the mere breach of fiduciary rela-
tionship or similar relationship of trust and confidence without a showing of
deception.158 In the court's view, this omission conflicted with the Supreme
Court's holding in Santa Fe, that a mere breach of fiduciary duty, absent de-
ception, did not give rise to liability under § 10(b). 159 Second, the theory
failed because it could not satisfy § 10(b)'s requirement that the persons de-
ceived have some connection to the security transaction, because it
"artificially divides into two discrete requirements-a fiduciary breach and a
purchase or sale of securities-the single indivisible requirement of deception
upon the purchaser or seller of securities, or upon some other person inti-
mately linked with or affected by a securities transaction."160 In this regard,
the Fourth Circuit's analysis follows the logic of Justice Powell's draft dis-
sent in Carpenter, that the fraud must be in the securities transaction for it to
152 See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) (accepting the misappropria-
tion theory and holding that one "violates Rule lOb-5 and § 10()... by misappropriating
and trading upon material information").
153 See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the misappro-
priation theory applies to fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
154 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the misappropriation theory because it
lacked support from the language of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, Supreme Court decisions in-
terpreting these provisions, or from the purposes of securities fraud provisions).
155 See id. at 937.
156 See id. at 939.
157 Id. at 946 (citations omitted).
158 See id. at 949.
1359 See Santa Fe Indus., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (holding that deception
is necessary to trigger § 10(b) liability).
160 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950.
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violate § 10(b).161
D. United States v. O'Hagan
1. The Eighth Circuit
In O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's rejection of
the misappropriation theory. 162 James O'Hagan was a prominent lawyer
with Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, the law firm Grand Met retained to
represent it in connection with a possible takeover of Pillsbury. 163 Despite
Grand Met's and Dorsey & Whitney's efforts to maintain confidentiality,
O'Hagan learned of the transaction and began purchasing Pillsbury call op-
tions and stock.164 When Grand Met announced its tender offer for Pills-
bury, O'Hagan realized a profit in excess of'$4 million.165 Following an
SEC investigation, O'Hagan was convicted of 57 counts of mail fraud, secu-
rities fraud, and money laundering. 166
In reversing all of the convictions, the Eighth Circuit rejected the misap-
propriation theory because it does not require deception, "contrary to §
10(b)'s explicit requirements," 1 67 and that in any event, it renders "nugatory
the requirement that the 'deception' be 'in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."168 The court adopted Bryan's analysis in its en-
tirety. 169
161 See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell's draft
dissent from denial of certiorari in Carpenter).
162 See United States v, O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 662 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
criminal liability could not be imposed under § 10(b) under the misappropriation theory),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
163 See id. at 614.
164 See id.
16 See id.
166 See id. The SEC obtained summary judgment in a parallel civil action against
O'Hagan based on the collateral estoppel effect of the conviction. See SEC v. O'Hagan,
901 F. Supp. 1461, 1461 (D. Minn. 1995).
167 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 620. The Eighth Circuit went further than the Bryan court, however, by
also invalidating the SEC's Rule 14e-3, see id. at 627, which prohibits the use in securities
trading of confidential information relating to tender offers, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)
(1997). The validity of the Rule had previously been upheld by the Second, see United
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); Seventh, see SEC v.
Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995); and Tenth Circuits, see SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d
1162, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit rejected the Rule because it does not
include any requirement of misrepresentation or nondisclosure. See OHagan, 92 F.3d at
625-26 (invalidating Rule 14e-3). In the court's view, this omission conflicted with Chi-
arella's holding that nondisclosure could be fraudulent only when there was a duty to dis-
close, and the court found no material differences between § 10(b) and § 14(e). See id. at
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2. The Supreme Court
In the face of the widening split in the circuits over the validity of the mis-
appropriation theory, the Supreme Court granted the government's petition
for certiorari. 170 In arguing for the validity of the misappropriation theory,
the government faced two principal challenges: (1) establishing that the the-
ory rests on "deception" within the meaning of § 10(b); and (2) establishing
that the deception required under the theory occurs "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of securities. The government argued that deception occurs
not merely when a misappropriator breaches a duty to a principal in using the
principal's confidential information, but rather, when the misappropriator
fails to disclose his intention to use the information. 171 Drawing from agency
principles, the government argued that O'Hagan's failure to disclose his
trading to his law firm and Grand Met made his conduct "deceptive" under §
10(b). 172 "[U]nder well settled principles, before an agent may use his prin-
cipal's confidential business information for his personal benefit, he must
make disclosure to the principal and obtain the principal's consent; the
breach of that duty thus inherently involves deceptive nondisclosure." 173
This failure to disclose in circumstances where disclosure is required distin-
guishes the misappropriation theory from the fully disclosed breach of fidu-
ciary obligation rejected as a basis for § 10(b) liability in Santa Fe. 174
The government's second challenge-establishing that the misappropria-
tion theory satisfies the "in connection with" requirement-raised a question
of pure statutory construction. The government argued that the statutory
phrase should be read "in its ordinary meaning, as 'related to' or
'involving.''175 Applying this standard to the facts of O'Hagan, the gov-
ernment urged that O'Hagan's
fraud was "in connection with" his purchases of Pillsbury securities be-
cause ... his trades were a necessary element of his fraud. The non-
public information about the Pillsbury takeover had no value to
[O'Hagan] personally except as it might enable him to reap windfall
profits in the securities market (or enable someone else to reap such
profits, through illegal tipping). Thus, . . . his deceptive fiduciary
breach and his purchase of securities were connected, because the
624-27. The court also overturned O'Hagan's mail fraud convictions, holding that "the
indictment was structured in such a manner as to premise the fraud for the mail fraud
charges on the acts allegedly constituting the securities fraud." Id. at 627.
170 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997) (No. 96-842).




174 See id. at 8.
175 Id. at 11.
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breach was consummated by his purchase of securities. 176
No alternative opportunity could have secured the windfall profits of $4.3
million that O'Hagan made trading Pillsbury options. But until O'Hagan
actually traded on the inside information, he had not actually converted it to
his own use, and thus, he had not yet breached his fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure. Only when O'Hagan used Grand Met's information for trading in the
securities markets did he finally breach that duty. Consequently, the gov-
ernment's theory of "deception"-trading without disclosure-converged
with its theory of why that fraudulent nondisclosure was "in connection
with" O'Hagan's trading.
The "deception" and "in connection with" requirements were the central
focus of oral argument before the Court. The first question posed by Justice
O'Connor to Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben concerned the de-







[S]uppose the defendant here had instead come clean,
and he told his superiors in the law firm that he was go-
ing to use this information. Then he would not be pos-
ing as a loyal employee any more, and it would have
been okay?
He would not have deceived his employer. He still
would have breached independent fiduciary duties that
he owed to that employer.
And you say he would still have breached the securities
laws?
No, I do not think he would have breached the securities
laws.
So that's the line? He didn't tell them that he was going
to go out and use it?
That's absolutely correct, and the reason why that is sig-
nificant is that § 10(b) prohibits deceptive devices and
contrivances. It requires deception. '
Thus, the government's brief and oral argument made clear that under the
misappropriation theory the "deception" element of § 10(b) is satisfied by an
agent's failure to disclose to his principal the agent's intention to use the
principal's confidential information for the agent's benefit.
Chief Justice Rehnquist raised concerns about the "in connection with" re-
quirement that were reminiscent of Justice Powell's draft dissent in Carpen-
ter:
176 Id.
17 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, United States v. O'Hagan (Apr. 16, 1997),
1997 WL 182584 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
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Well, Mr. Dreeben, . . . the thing that bothers me about
the case here is, where is the connection between the de-
ceptive device and the purchase or sale of a security?
The connection, Chief Justice Rehnquist, lies in the fact
that the misappropriation does not occur until the lawyer
uses the information as the basis for his trades. It is that
very information which drives his participation in the
market and allows the profits to be... reaped by him.
But he didn't deceive anyone who sold him securities.
That is true. The misappropriation theory doesn't rely
on the notion that he owed a duty of disclosure to the
shareholders on the other side of the transaction, but it
does satisfy the requisite connection between the fraud
and the securities trading, because it is only in the trad-
ing that the fraud is consummated. There could be no
closer-
But you think of fraud being practiced on a person who
is damaged by it.
I think under the common law view of fraud, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, that is an accurate statement, but the se-
curities laws are not framed to pick up only those viola-
tions that are covered by common law fraud. Congress
did not pass a statute that says, it is unlawful to commit
fraud on the purchaser or seller of securities.
Congress did not pass a law even that said it is unlaw-
ful to commit fraud in a securities transaction. It passed
a law with a broader phrase, in connection with a secu-
rities transaction, because the very aim of this section
was to pick up unforeseen, cunning, deceptive devices
that people might cleverly use in the securities mar-
kets. 178
The Chief Justice's questions suggest that he believed that § 10(b) was lim-
ited to the common law of deceit, and that the fraud had to be in the securi-
ties transaction. This is essentially the position taken by Justice Powell, 179 in
which the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor concurred at the time of Car-
178 Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
179 See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell's view that
the fraud had to occur in the securities transaction). The Chief Justice dissented in
O'Hagan, while Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1997).
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penter 180
O'Hagan's counsel attempted to capitalize on the issue raised by the Chief
Justice's line of questioning. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's analysis in
Bryan, he argued that deception and the securities transaction had to be "a
unitary concept":
COUNSEL: The unitary concept is deception or manipulation in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security. To me,
that means the buyer or seller of the security deceives
the person on the other side of the transaction. It's not
as if you deceive someone over here and then later on
you benefit from it by dealing with somebody else.
Mr. Dreeben's remark, it seems to me, fits with my
theory of this case. He says ... it has to be in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security because the
only way Mr. O'Hagan could profit was in the purchase
or sale of a security. Not so. That assumes Mr.
O'Hagan has no imagination. Mr. O'Hagan could have
said, I now have a useful piece of information. I have
misappropriated it. I'm going to profit on it by selling it
to the trade press. I can get a good fee for this informa-
tion.
So the misappropriation would have occurred, but it
had been disconnected from the purchase or sale of the
security.
QUESTION: It's not entirely disconnected. The trade press would
only be interested in it because the people who read the
trade press would be able to buy securities on the basis
of this confidential information. 181
Counsel for O'Hagan provided the Court with another hypothetical:
COUNSEL: I'll give you another hypothetical, Your Honor, because
I'm firmly convinced that the statute doesn't read the
way Mr. Dreeben says it does. You cannot disconnect
the misappropriation from the purchase and sale of secu-
rities and say it's satisfied.
Mr. O'Hagan's office in Minneapolis is across the
street from the Pillsbury Company. He could have said
to himself, I have always wanted the business of the
11o See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell in dissent from denial of certiorari).
181 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 177, at 35 (discussing the unitary con-
cept).
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Pillsbury Company. I will walk across the street, mis-
appropriating this information of my law firm and its cli-
ent, deliver it to the Pillsbury Company, and suggest to
the Pillsbury Company that in the future they might find
it very desirable to use me for legal work.
That wouldn't have had anything to do with the pur-
chase and sale of the security, and yet it would have
profited Mr. O'Hagan if it had worked. 1
82
Experienced appellate lawyers know that many cases are decided before
oral argument, but in some cases, oral argument can be decisive. O'Hagan
may have been such a case. The government was able to demonstrate the
logical limits of its theory of deception, and show how that deception was "in
connection with" a securities transaction. The misappropriation was "in
connection with" O'Hagan's securities trading because he had not breached
his duty of disclosure until he actually traded. O'Hagan's counsel was un-
able to parry that argument with a convincing response. 
8 3
The Court's decision accepted the misappropriation theory in its en-
tirety. 184 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, had little difficulty in
finding that the misappropriation theory satisfied § 10(b)'s deception re-
quirement. 185 She distinguished Santa Fe on the grounds that:
Deception through nondisclosure is central to the [misappropriation]
theory .... [F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappro-
priation theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fi-
duciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the non-public
information, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no § 10(b) viola-
tion-although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state
law for breach of a duty of loyalty.'
8 6
Thus, nondisclosure in breach of a duty of disclosure remained the touch-
stone for a finding of deception under § 10(b), just as it had been in Chi-
arella. That duty of disclosure, however, was found in the common law of
agency rather than the common law of deceit. 87
182 Id. at 35-37.
183 See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Confidence, AM. LAW., June 1997, at 75-76
(reviewing the O'Hagan oral arguments).
184 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997) (upholding the convic-
tions under the misappropriation theory).
185 See id. at 2208 (stating that the misappropriation theory "satisfies § 10(b)'s re-
quirement that chargeable conduct involve 'deceptive device or contrivance'").
186 Id. at 2208-09. Justice Ginsburg reinforced the point, stating "it [was O'Hagan's]
failure to disclose his personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to
do so, that ma[de] his conduct 'deceptive' within the meaning of 10(b)." Id. at 2211.
187 See id. at 2208 (discussing how a fiduciary breaches his duty of loyalty when con-
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Ginsburg departed further from Justice Powell's legacy in her finding that
the misappropriation theory satisfied § 10(b)'s "in connection with" require-
ment:
This element is satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated,
not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when,
without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase
or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus
coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not
the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the non-public
information. A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material,
nonpublic information, in short, gains is advantageous market position
through deception; he deceives the source of the information and si-
multaneously harms members of the investing public. 
88
Ginsburg gave short shrift to the alternative uses for Grand Met's confiden-
tial information hypothesized by O'Hagan's counsel; 89 in her view, it suf-
ficed that the information "ordinarily" would have value only in securities
trading.19° Thus, the misappropriation theory was consistent with the text of
§ 10(b).
Justice Ginsburg's treatment of the Court's prior precedents further dem-
onstrated O'Hagan's departure from Justice Powell's vision of insider trad-
ing law. She rebuffed the notion that Chiarella required that the fraud be
between parties to the securities transaction.' 9' The statements in Chiarella
that suggested such an interpretation of § 10(b) merely "rejected the notion
that § 10(b) stretches so far as to impose 'a general duty between all partici-
pants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, non-public
information,' and we confine them to that context."1 She also noted that
Dirks specifically had reserved the question of trading on misappropriated
information. 93 Thus, Justice Ginsburg's treatment of Chiarella and Dirks
diverged completely from Justice Powell's understanding of those cases as
expressed in his draft dissent from denial of certiorari in Carpenter.
Ginsburg concluded that it would "make[ ] scant sense to hold a lawyer
verting the agent's information for personal gain).
188 Id. at 2209.
189 See id. at 2210 n.8 (discounting O'Hagan's counsels' hypothetical uses of the cli-
ent's information, such as selling it to a trade journal or using it to seek a legal position
with Pillsbury).
190 See id. at 2210.
191 See id. at 2212 ("The Court did not hold in Chiarella that the only relationship
prompting liability for trading on undisclosed information is the relationship between a
corporation's insiders and shareholders.").
'9 Id. (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
193 See id. at 2213 (arguing that Dirks did not support that § 10(b) does not prevent
those who acquire nonpublic information through misappropriation and then trade based on
that information).
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like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the
target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the
bidder" 194 in light of "the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading
on misappropriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying §
10(b)." 195 Policy concerns and congressional intent, not the common law of
deceit followed by Powell in Chiarella and Dirks, guided the Court's deci-
sion in O'Hagan.1
96
These interests did not lead to a limitless prohibition against trading based
on informational advantages, however, because the theory reaches only the
"person who gains non-public information gained through misappropriation
in breach of fiduciary duty" 197 and then "without alerting the source...
trades on the information. " 198 That duty to alert the source of the informa-
tion arises from the law of agency.
E. Puzzles in the Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory, like the classical theory, creates a series of
puzzles. Most prominently, the agency law principles incorporated by the
194 Id. at 2210-11.
195 Id. at 2211. The Court also reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling on Rule 14e-3,
holding that the Commission had not exceeded its authority in promulgating the Rule. See
id. at 2217 (upholding Rule 14e-3 as applied to cases like O'Hagan). The Court held that
§ 14(e) authorized the Commission to adopt rules reasonably designed to prevent fraud,
even if the conduct proscribed was not itself fraudulent. See id. (upholding the Commis-
sion's prohibitions if "reasonably designed to prevent ... acts and practices that are
fraudulent" even if not fraudulent themselves under the common law). The Court ac-
cepted the government's argument that Rule 14e-3 serves this preventive purpose by pro-
hibiting trading activity in a class of cases where there is likely to be a breach of fiduciary
duty, but the breach is difficult to prove. See id. at 2219 (validating Rule 14e-3 "insofar
as it serves to prevent the type of misappropriation charged against O'Hagan"). Having
reversed the Eighth Circuit's judgment on the securities fraud counts, the Court also re-
versed the lower court's ruling on the mail fraud convictions. See id. at 2220.
196 Justice Scalia dissented in part, stating that, "[w]hile the Court's explanation of the
scope of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would be entirely reasonable in some other context, it
does not seem to accord with the principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes." Id. at
2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented in part. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the misappropriation theory failed to provide an ac-
ceptable interpretation of § 10(b)'s requirement that a deceptive device be used in connec-
tion with a securities transaction). While Thomas agreed that the undisclosed misappro-
priation of confidential information involves "deception," he argued that deception in a
misappropriation case is not "in connection with" a securities transaction. See id. at 2221.
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the "in connection
with" requirement needs a more "integral" connection than what the majority required).
197 Id. at 2213.
198 Id.
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misappropriation theory apply whether or not the victim of the fraud has a
connection to the securities markets.199 The misappropriation theory might
have more intuitive appeal if the victims were always market participants, or
businesses with close connections to market participants, such as investment
banks and law firms.2°° For example, in O'Hagan, that connection existed
because Grand Met intended to become a purchaser of Pillsbury securities,
and therefore O'Hagan's trading was both in competition with, and posed a
real risk of harm to, Grand Met. 201 By contrast, in Bryan, the West Virginia
Lottery Commission did not intend to enter the securities market, and there
was minimal risk that it would be harmed by Bryan's trading. 2 2 Although
the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory was not prem-
ised on a lack of connection to a market participant, that lack of connection
may have influenced the court's decision,
Notwithstanding this concern, there is no principled way to limit the mis-
appropriation theory to market participants. Neither the statutory language
of § 10(b), nor the principles of agency law, so circumscribe the theory's
reach. 20 3 While the common law of agency only precludes agents from using
their principal's confidential information "in competition with or to the injury
of the principal" 2°4 the disclosure requirements imposed by agency law-and
incorporated by the misappropriation theory-are not so narrow: "an agent is
subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information
199 See Langevoort, supra note 85, at 47 ("The source of the information is not neces-
sarily defrauded as part of any investment-related activity of its own.").
200 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 202 (1991) (noting that fraud in an insider
trading case is questionable when the victim is not a market participant); Mitchell, supra
note 84, at 830 (questioning the appropriateness of using securities fraud laws against
those not trading in the stock about which the misappropriated information concerns);
Lawrence A. Rosenbloom, Note, Is It Inside or Out?-A Proposal To Clarify the Misap-
propriation Theory of Unlawful Trading, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 867, 900 (1996) (proposing
that misappropriation theory be limited to fiduciary breaches or similar relationships
"closely tied to the securities marketplace and pos[ing] a direct and imminent danger to the
market" (emphasis omitted)).
201 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
202 See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (1995) (explaining that the West Vir-
ginia Lottery Commission has no connection to the securities transaction).
203 See Fisch, supra note 200, at 190. Fisch states:
Applying agency law principles to insider trading is problematic ... because agency
law does not generate an obligation to the trading counterparty or to the market.
Rather, agency law suggests that a corporate insider is unjustly enriched by making
use of corporate information for his personal benefit and that any trading profits are
rightfully the property of the owner of the information-the corporation. This unjust
enrichment takes place, though, whether or not the insider discloses the information
prior to trading.
Id.
204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
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which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has no-
tice, the principal would desire to have. "20 This broader disclosure re-
quirement allows the principal, whether or not he is a market participant, to
decide if he would be harmed by the agent's trading. Moreover, the broad
disclosure required by agency law is more consistent with the purposes of
insider trading prohibitions, because trading on misappropriated information
impairs the integrity of the market, whether or not it has been purloined from
a market participant. 206
The misappropriation theory also creates the oddity that the victim of the
misappropriation usually does not have a cause of action against the wrong-
doer under the federal securities laws. Under the rule of Blue Chip Stamps,
only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue under § 10(b). 20 7
As with the classical theory, Congress has created a statutory remedy for
contemporaneous traders, but that provision affords no relief to the immedi-
ate victim of misappropriation. 2°8 State law, of course, may provide a rem-
edy. 20
Finally, the misappropriation theory is subject to contractual waiver. If
the entity from whom the information has been obtained consents to the
trading, there is no violation of § 10(b). 210 This aspect of the misappropria-
205 Id. § 381.
206 See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text (discussing the effects on the market
of trading on misappropriated information).
207 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (holding
that under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, only actual purchasers and sellers of securities can
bring a private damages action); see also Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, -Inc.,
967 F.2d 742, 749 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that tender offerors who have purchased secu-
rities may have a cause of action under § 10(b) if they can establish loss causation).
m See Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994). Prior
to Congress's passage of § 20A, the Second Circuit had ruled that contemporaneous trad-
ers had no private cause of action against misappropriators because they were not the vic-
tims of the fraud. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1983).
Section 20A was specifically intended to overrule Moss. See Kaswell, supra note 151, at
167 (noting that § 20A "specifically overturns the holding in Moss v. Morgan Stanley").
Section 20A, of course, creates a doctrinal puzzle of its own, as the plaintiffs entitled to
sue under that provision are not the victims of the fraud.
m9 But see infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of state law on
insider trading).
210 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 85, at 52 (noting examples that the misappropria-
tion theory does not cover such as where "executives of a company about to award a prof-
itable contract to another trade in the other company's stock, they are not misappropriating
the information if they trade with the approval of their own company"). There would be
liability, however, under Rule 14e-3 in the context of tender offers. See supra note 195
and accompanying text (discussing Rule 14e-3). The corporation's ability to waive its
property rights in information means that market analysts will not risk misappropriation
liability for trading on information given to them by the company.
1998]
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tion theory has troubled some commentators, 2" but it is not a serious defect
in the misappropriation theory. The fact that the rule is not mandatory pro-
vides some assurance of its efficiency. If the misappropriation theory does
create obstacles to useful business arrangements, corporations and their em-
ployees will simply contract around it.2 12 In any event, few corporations in
the shoes of Grand Met would consent to trading by their agents. 213 Such
trading would come at the expense of their own shareholders, who would be
forced to pay more for acquisitions. Authorizing insider trading could ex-
pose the directors to lawsuit under state corporate law for waste if the corpo-
ration did not receive adequate compensation for the information. 2 4 For this
reason, companies are not likely to compensate their officers, directors, law-
yers and investment bankers by allowing them to trade on confidential busi-
ness information. Furthermore, government enforcement of these contrac-
tual arrangements is appropriate because of the adverse effect on the
securities markets and the difficulty that corporations would face in enforcing
prohibitions on their own.
211 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 200, at 224. Fisch states:
A more troubling aspect of treating inside information as property is that such treat-
ment does not justify government intervention to allocate the property rights to infor-
mation. If inside information is the property of the firm producing it, why is it dif-
ferent from any other firm property, which the firm may allocate, as it chooses, by
contract? This view would enable a firm to authorize its officers or employees to
trade on the basis of inside information. The firm would, in effect, be opting out of
the government enforcement of its property rights.
Id.
212 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading,
80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1468 (1986) (arguing that corporations should be allowed to opt
out of restrictions on insider trading).
213 A corporation could not authorize such trading in its own shares because it would
run foul of the classical theory. See McCormick v. Fund Am. Co., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Numerous authorities have held or otherwise stated that the corporate issuer
in possession of material non-public information, must, like other insiders in the same
situation, disclose the information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.").
Because the duties of the classical theory are owed directly to the individual shareholders,
a knowing and intelligent waiver of those duties by the shareholders would be nearly im-
possible. This aspect of the classical theory also conflicts with common law. See Kors v.
Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. Ch. 1960) (holding that corporation has no duty of disclo-
sure to shareholders in repurchasing shares); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Meta-
phor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 916-21 (discussing prob-
lems with treating corporation as fiduciary of shareholders and disclosure obligations in
the context of share repurchase).
214 See ERNEST L. FOLK III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAw § 141.2.11 (1992) ("The duty of directors also includes a settled prohibition against
waste of corporate assets.").
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III. AGENCY LAW AND THE PURPOSES OF INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS
The Court's shift away from the common law of deceit in O'Hagan has
important implications for the law of insider trading. Most importantly, the
Court's endorsement of the misappropriation theory has validated an impor-
tant weapon in the government's fight against insider trading. Although the
misappropriation theory sweeps broadly, it is well grounded in the common
law of agency. As Justice Ginsburg recognized, those agency law principles
limit the misappropriation theory's reach "to those who breach a recognized
duty." 215 Thus, this weapon has built-in checks on its use. The misappro-
priation theory is not only consistent with the common law, it is also nar-
rowly tailored to the purposes of insider trading prohibitions.
A. The Common Law of Agency
The Restatement (Second) of Agency restricts an agent's use of confidential
information that belongs to his principal either "in competition with or to the
injury of the principal" without the principal's consent.216 This requirement
of consent gives rise to the agent's disclosure duties; only with full disclosure
will the principal be able to determine whether the agent's use of information
would be in competition with or injure the principal. 217 Specifically, the
agent is required to disclose "if the agent has ... interests adverse to the
principal as to matters within the scope of the agency, or if he is competing
with the principal and using information acquired during his agency. "218 An
agent may act for his own benefit, but only after "he makes a full disclosure
of the facts to an acquiescent principal and takes no unfair advantage of
him."219 The disclosure requirement affords the principal an opportunity to
seek an injunction against the agent's trading or, more realistically, an ac-
counting of his profits. 22°
The misappropriation theory incorporates this disclosure requirement of
agency law into the securities laws. The securities markets provide an espe-
cially tempting venue for a faithless agent to breach his fiduciary duty to his
principal and misappropriate confidential information. They afford an op-
portunity to breach that duty in secret and to collect enormous profits. The
215 United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214 (1997).
216 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
217 See id. § 395 cmt. c ("In obtaining consent of the principal to use or disclose confi-
dential information, the agent is under the duty of disclosure stated in § 390.").
218 Id. § 381 cmt. d. This specific duty of disclosure is a part of the agent's broader
duty to keep his principal informed: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a
duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs
entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have."
Id. § 381.
219 Id. § 390 cmt. a.
220 See id. § 399 (listing possible remedies for a principal against an agent who has
violated her duty).
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facts of O'Hagan demonstrate the potential harm to the principal that could
result from such a breach. O'Hagan's trading posed a risk that Grand Met's
plans to take over Pillsbury would be prematurely discovered by others in the
market. Such a discovery could have raised the price that Grand Met was
forced to pay by many millions of dollars, as the market would have reval-
ued Pillsbury's shares in light of the impending takeover. 1 O'Hagan was
secretly competing with his principal by purchasing the shares that Grand
Met intended to purchase, thereby threatening enormous harm to his princi-
pal's interests. State fiduciary law alone is unlikely to deter such breaches
because they are so difficult to detect.m The misappropriation theory brings
the enforcement authority-and subpoena power-of the federal government
to bear on the problem, thus greatly enhancing the probability of detection,
punitive sanctions, and as a result, compliance.3 The O'Hagan case pro-
vides a concrete example of the advantages of government enforcement-
Dorsey & Whitney first learned of O'Hagan's malfeasance when the firm
was subpoenaed by the SEC.
B. Misappropriation Theory's Close Connection to the Goals of Insider
Trading Prohibitions
The misappropriation theory protects more than just property rights in
valuable information. It also protects the integrity of the stock markets and
public confidence in those markets.Y 4 Insider trading impairs investor confi-
dence, thereby discouraging capital formation and reducing liquidity.225
12 See Bradford Cornell & Erik R. Sirri, The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to
Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1031, 1032-33, 1045-46 (1992) (presenting empirical evidence
that price increases result from insider trading); Lisa Meulbroek & Carolyn Hart, The Ef-
fect of Illegal Insider Trading on Takeover Premia, 1 EUROPEAN FIN. REV. 51, 51 (1997)
(finding that insider trading results in bidding companies paying larger takeover premia).
2n See Dooley, supra note 88, at 28 (stating that "the typical offense is so furtive in
nature that it can be detected only through the use of the broad investigative powers of the
federal government").
I See Easterbrook, supra note 98, at 334 (discussing advantages of public enforcement
of insider trading prohibitions); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw 393 (3d ed. 1986) (hypothesizing that because of the low probability of detection, it
may not be cost effective for companies to stop insider trading because they cannot impose
penalties); Cox & Fogarty, supra note 73, at 356 n.12 (arguing that corporate efforts to
discourage insider trading may be deterred by "the practical difficulty of undertaking po-
licing efforts whose effectiveness would justify their cost, by the willingness of public
authorities to assume some of this burden, and by the imperfect identity of interests be-
tween managers and the corporation").
I There is clearly a strong federal interest in the integrity of the national stock mar-
kets. See Hamermesh, supra note 58, at 1175 (describing "the regulation of disclosure in
the interest of facilitating interstate markets for securities" as "historically and far more
properly a federal matter").
m Liquidity means that there is an active market for shares-that is, at any given time
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Because insider trading reduces the returns from investing in the stock
market, investors will discount the amount that they are willing to pay for
shares to reflect the risk of insider trading, thus impairing capital forma-
tion.226 Investors are reluctant to play in what they perceive to be a rigged
game. 227 At a minimum, they must be compensated for bearing the risk that
the game is fixed. 228 Corporations pay the price for this discounting because
they receive less when they sell shares to the public. Insider trading prohibi-
tions reduce this discounting by investors. 229
Insider trading reduces liquidity because outsiders will be reluctant to
trade with insider traders. Outsiders do not know whether the share price
accurately reflects the company's future prospects, but they do know that
they are going to be net losers in transactions with insiders. 230 Insider trad-
ers will only buy when they know that the stock price is too low, and they
will only sell when they know the stock price is too high.231 Therefore, any-
time an outsider trades with an insider, the outsider knows that the insider
trader is taking advantage of her. 232 But in an impersonal market, outsiders
there are plenty of willing buyers and sellers. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT
GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 305 (4th ed. 1995).
226 See Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 325 (arguing that shareholders will pay less for
stock when insider trading is expected); Michael Manove, The Harm from insider Trading
and Informed Speculation, 104 Q.J. ECON. 823, 823-24 (1989) (observing that
"sophisticated outsiders" will pay less for shares' if they are aware of insider trading).
227 See 134 CONG. REC. S17,278 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Prox-
mire) (discussing the view held by small investors that they are cheated by the stock mar-
ket when corrupted by insider trading).
228 See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
"Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 638 (arguing that because investors can discount
stocks by the average risk of insider trading for all firms, insider trading does not harm
investors who hold diversified portfolios).
229 See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 1022, 1036 (1990) (proposing that regulations of insider trading are Pa-
reto improvements, creating greater investment and greater returns).
2" See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1021 (1992) ("If stock prices are inaccurate because they do
not reflect some non-public information, but no person who possesses that information
trades, uninformed investors would have no reason to anticipate a loss by trading."). Al-
though uninformed investors trading with each other will have gains and losses from indi-
vidual trades, those gains and losses are random and will balance out over a large number
of trades. See Boyd Kimball Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Mar-
kets, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1, 59 (observing that some investors who buy when a company
is concealing information will gain and some investors will lose, but gains and losses
"will be distributed at random among investors and will be equal and offsetting").
231 See Manove, supra note 226, at 823 (arguing that where there is insider trading,
"shares are more likely to be available to outsiders when, unbeknownst to them, the eco-
nomic value of the corporation is low than when it is high").
232 See William S. Wang, Trading on Material Non-public Information on Impersonal
19981
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do not know when they are trading with an insider, so insider trading simply
becomes a transaction cost of all trading. 233 This discourages outsiders from
trading, thus reducing liquidity.
The transaction cost of insider trading is directly incorporated in the price
of trading. Market makers also know that they are at a disadvantage when
trading with insiders, and like outsiders, they cannot know when they are
trading with an insider. In order to compensate for the losses suffered by
trading with an insider, market makers increase the bid-ask spread. For ex-
ample, instead of buying at $10 and selling at $10.25, market makers buy at
$10 and sell at $10 .50. 234 This increase in the bid-ask spread also increases
transaction costs for investors, who are therefore less likely to buy and
sell. 235 This risk of dealing with insider traders is magnified in the options
market, a favorite haven for insider traders because of the leverage it pro-
vides to the value of their information. 23 6 Insider trading makes options
more expensive to buy and sell, thereby further impairing liquidity.
The impairment of capital formation and liquidity caused by insider trad-
ing is not limited to situations involving the classical theory in which insiders
are trading with their own shareholders, but rather it implicates all cases in-
volving disparities in information. 237 The misappropriation theory's broader
Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1235 (1981) (arguing that the "Law of Conservation of Securities"
mandates that profits gained by an insider must be directly offset by losses to other inves-
tors).
233 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Mar-
ket Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1993) (describing the transaction cost of trading without information as the
amount of insiders' profits divided by the total number of outsider trades); cf. Cox, supra
note 228, at 638 ("[Ihe risk of abusive insider-trading practices, even though random for
the individual firm, becomes systematic due to the informational asymmetries that charac-
terize public corporations. Because it is systematic, this risk cannot be reduced by diversi-
fication . . ").
2 See Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the
Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 141 (1988) (presenting evidence that insider trad-
ing increases the bid/ask spread); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and
Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J.
FIN. ECON. 71, 98 (1985) (finding that inside information is one of several factors that
widens the bid/ask spread).
235 See Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopolist
Specialist, 62 J. Bus. L. 211, 228 (1989) ("Trading on private information... leads to
less than optimal risk sharing. This occurs because the response of market makers to the
existence of traders with private information is to reduce the liquidity of the market ...
[which] reduces the amount of trade and hence the amount of risk sharing.").
236 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider
Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAw. 187, 196 (1993) (explaining advantages
that option markets provide to insider traders).
237 See Salbu, supra note 97, at 233 (explaining that prohibiting insider trading when
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scope allows enforcement authorities to combat those disparities created as a
result of wrongdoing in the many situations not reached by the classical the-
ory3. 3 8 At the same time, however, the misappropriation theory has natural
limits, implicit in the common law of agency, that make its application pre-
dictable and prevent it from becoming the "parity of information" theory that
Powell feared. 239
By limiting the misappropriation theory to information obtained in breach
of a duty, the common law of agency protects individuals who have gained
their informational advantage through superior insight or hard work.Y4
These efforts are essential to the informational efficiency 241 of the stock mar-
ket. 242 Accordingly, the misappropriation theory does not interfere with the
legitimate processes that lead to efficient pricing of securities in the way that
a broader parity of information theory might.2
43
The misappropriation theory also puts tippee and tipper liability on a more
solid footing. Disclosures that would be a breach of duty to the corpora-
tion-absent prior disclosure to the board-are proscribed; disclosures that
trades are made on misappropriated nonpublic information does not ensure market integ-
rity because any disparity in information, even those legitimately obtained, may result in
market failure); cf. Fisch, supra note 200, at 223 ("[For the investor-victim, it is irrele-
vant whether the trader has acquired inside information through the breach of a duty or
not; anyone who trades based on superior information not available to the investing public
has obtained a trading advantage that is arguably unfair.").
238 See supra notes 199-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader sweep of the
securities laws under the misappropriation theory compared with the classical theory).
239 See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (describing the limits that agency law
places on the misappropriation theory).
240 See Fisch, supra note 200, at 222-23 ("Market professionals expend a great deal of
effort trying to obtain information that does not duplicate what everyone else has, through
discussions with corporate insiders, following the progress of important litigation, or
monitoring news reports and the Dow Jones tape constantly.").
241 Efficiency means that at any given time prices reflect all available information about
the company and its future prospects. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 225, at 160
(defining the efficient market hypothesis). In other words, the stock price is the best-not
perfect-estimate of the net present value of future dividends and the company's growth.
Therefore, the more quickly a given market incorporates information into a stock price,
the more efficient it is.
242 See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emer-
gence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1007, 1013 (1990) ("Competition among market professionals in a liquid market as-
sures even the more ignorant investors that these market prices reflect all the publicly
available information about the firms behind the securities." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
243 See John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1318 (1981) ("[The securities laws should preserve incentives to
market research by recognizing in the collector of outside information a right of trade
without disclosure, and to earn profits at the expense of the less informed.").
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do not breach any legitimate confidentiality interest possessed by the corpo-
ration are legal. Duties to shareholders are irrelevant to this inquiry.
Insider traders, knowing that they have a monopoly over the relevant in-
formation, trade strategically, because extracting the full monopoly benefit
from their information depends upon concealing their trading. 244 Insider
traders split their trades between the equity and options markets, break their
trades into small blocks, trade through off-shore accounts, and use multiple
brokers to execute the trades, all in an attempt to prevent other traders in the
market from discovering that they are trading on inside information. Be-
cause insiders can and do conceal their trading, insider trading does little to
enhance the efficiency of stock market pricing. 245
By prohibiting trading by individuals with a monopoly over inside infor-
mation, insider trading law encourages market analysts, professional inves-
tors, and others to compete for the information that drives efficiency in
pricing. 246 These informed investors will not make the same profits as insid-
ers because they have to compete with other market analysts; that competi-
tion dissipates monopoly profits. 247 The forces of competition discourage
attempts to conceal trading, because an investor who believes that a stock is
mispriced knows that other investors are also. likely to be trading. If the in-
vestor delays,, others will beat him to the punch and the profitable opportu-
nity will be gone. Trading under competition will send stocks to their effi-
cient prices at a lower cost to investors than insider trading based on an
244 See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Eric S. Maskin, The Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market, 98J. POL. ECON. 70 (1990) (modeling
trading strategies by insider traders that do not lead to revealing the insiders' information).
See also Manove, supra note 226, at 828 (explaining that if insider traders do not exercise
restraint but rather trade excessively in a short period of time, the insider traders' knowl-
edge becomes reflected in the share's price and thus the public becomes informed).
245 See Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 44-45 (observing that insider trading does little to
convey inside information to the market); Dyer, supra note 230, at 31 (same); Kahan, su-
pra note 230, at 1004 (concluding that insider trading activities do not necessarily convey
the presence of insider information to the market because investors may not be able to dis-
tinguish between trades motivated by inside information and other motivations because in-
siders may try to conceal their trading activities). Of course, incompetent or greedy in-
sider traders may be unable to conceal their trading, and they consequently have a greater
effect on prices. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trad-
ing, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1696 (1992) (finding, based on a sample of detected insider trading,
that 40 to 50% of the run-up in price before public announcement of takeovers occurs on
days with known insider trading).
246 See Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Inside Trad-
ing, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 297, 311-12 (1994) (arguing that insider trading reduces com-
petition and has the effect of a monopoly).
247 See Georgakopoulos, supra note 233, at 21 ("A monopolist trader can expect to be
able to trade repeatedly on the same piece of information. By contrast .... [c]ompetition
decreases the number of trades that can be made on the information.").
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informational monopoly. 248 Thus, the misappropriation theory strikes an ap-
propriate balance between the purposes of insider trading law and the
mechanisms of market efficiency. 24 9
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan shifts the foundations of in-
sider trading jurisprudence. The decision's focus on the common law of
agency as the basis for analyzing whether an individual's trading is a decep-
tive misappropriation frees insider trading law of the classical theory's limi-
tations. At the same time, the misappropriation theory provides a rational
and principled basis for prohibiting conduct that has no social utility and im-
pairs the integrity of the securities markets.
Despite the misappropriation theory's firm foundation in the common law
and its utility in promoting the goals of the federal securities laws, Justice
Powell likely would have voted to reject the theory. Based on his draft dis-
sent to the denial of certiorari in Carpenter, we know that Powell believed
the misappropriation theory was inconsistent with his prior decisions for the
Court in Chiarella and Dirks. The flaw in the theory, according to Powell's
draft dissent, was that it broadly extends to any victim of a deceptive misap-
propriation, regardless of whether the victim is a party to a securities trans-
action. Powell apparently believed that premising liability on breaches of a
fiduciary duty to persons other than securities traders would impermissibly
expand the scope of the federal securities laws beyond the common law of
deceit, the foundation of the classical theory.
Justice Powell's concerns about the scope of the misappropriation theory
have been laid to rest by the logic of Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in
O'Hagan. As Justice Ginsburg explained, a breach of duty by an agent to
his principal crystallizes at the moment the agent engages in a securities
transaction without disclosure to his principal: the agent does not commit
fraud on his principal unless and until the agent engages in a securities trans-
action without disclosure. Possessing confidential information, but not using
it, does not breach the agent's disclosure duty. The securities transaction
completes the agent's deception of his principal and simultaneously injures
the integrity of the securities markets, the harm that insider trading prohibi-
tions are intended to prevent. The nexus between the agent's breach of duty
to his principal and transactions in the securities markets supplies the con-
nection to the purchase or sale of a security that Justice Powell believed was
248 See Macey & Kanda, supra note 242, at 1015 ("[R]ivalrous competition among
well-informed market professionals causes rapid assimilation of information accessible to
the community of investment analysts into share prices at low cost to investors.").
249 See Manove, supra note 226, at 826 (arguing that the economic value of the release
of information through informed trading by market professionals may more than offset the
losses attributable to adverse selection and inefficiency and the costs of acquiring the in-
formation).
HeinOnline  -- 78 B. U. L. Rev. 53 1998
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
missing in the misappropriation theory. That nexus satisfies § 10(b)'s "in
connection with" requirement, even if it does not satisfy the elements of the
common law of deceit.
Justice Powell's legacy for the law of insider trading is the recognition of
the need to anchor § 10(b) in common law principles. The common law de-
fines and limits the law of insider trading, both under the classical theory and
the misappropriation theory. Powell drew upon the common law of deceit
for such guidance and found there a requirement that silence, in order to be
fraudulent, had to be in breach of a duty to disclose to the shareholder on the
other side of the transaction. But the law of deceit left gaps in the analytical
framework. The Court in O'Hagan filled those gaps by relying on the com-
mon law of agency, rather than the common law of deceit.
The disclosure duties imposed by the common law of agency provide a
rational, comprehensible basis for determining whether an agent's breach of
duty constitutes a deception within the meaning of § 10(b). While Justice
Powell's draft in Carpenter indicates that he viewed the misappropriation
theory as a departure from the principles underlying the classical theory,
Justice Ginsburg and a majority of the current Court saw the misappropria-
tion theory as essential to the protection of the integrity of the securities mar-
kets. Their rejection of the common law of deceit as the outer limit of in-
sider trading law circumscribes Justice Powell's legacy to the narrow reach
of the classical theory. The Court's acceptance of the misappropriation the-
ory based on agency law principles establishes a lasting foundation for the
law of insider trading.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID CARPENTER, KENNETH P. FELIS, AND
R. FOSTER WINANS v. UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 86-422. Decided December -, 1986
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has re-
solved an important question of securities law in a way that appears to con-
flict with recent opinions of this Court. As this decision-particularly by this
Court of Appeals-could have substantial precedential effect, I would grant
the pejition for certiorari with respect to question 1.
I
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' convictions for
wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud. Question 1 of the petition chal-
1998]
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lenges the securities fraud convictions. The convictions rest on a conspiracy
involving petitioner Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, and peti-
tioners Felis and Brant, stockbrokers with the firm of Kidder Peabody. The
final party to the conspiracy was petitioner Carpenter, an employee of the
Wall Street Journal who carried messages from Winans to Felis and Brant.
Winans informed Brant and Felis of the dates on which the Wall Street Jour-
nal would publish columns discussing particular securities. Advance knowl-
edge of the dates on which certain columns would appear enabled Brant and
Felis to profit by trading in anticipation of price changes that would follow
publication of the columns. The columns themselves consisted of public in-
formation. The only nonpublic information provided by Winans was the
publication schedule for the columns.
The petitioners were charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities
fraud. After a bench trial, the District Court convicted petitioners. United
States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N. Y. 1985). On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024 (1986). In the Court of Appeals' view, petitioners were guilty of
criminal securities fraud under the "misappropriation" theory of securities
fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §
78j(b), and Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240. lOb-5. Under this theory, a person is
liable under Rule lOb-5 if he misappropriates material nonpublic information
and then uses the information in connection with the purchase or sale of se-
curities. Id., at 1031-1032. The Court of Appeals noted that we left open the
question of the legitimacy of the misappropriation theory in Chiarella. But
the court noted that its Circuit has adopted that theory since our decision in
Chiarella. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F. 2d 197 (CA2 1984), cert. denied,
471 U. S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F. 2d 12 (CA2 1981),
affirmed after remand, 722 F. 2d 729 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 863
(1983).
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument that the misappro-
priation theory could not be applied in this case because the information was
misappropriated not from the corporations whose securities were traded, but
from the Wall Street Journal. The court believed that our recent opinion in
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983), offered substantial support to petition-
ers' contention, but concluded that "[i]t is not accurate to say that Dirks
wrote the book on insider or outsider trading; it wrote one chapter with re-
spect to one type of fraudulent trading." 791 F. 2d, at 1029 (quoting the
District Court's opinion, United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 842 (S.
D.N. Y. 1985)). The Court of Appeals concluded that Winans' appropriation
of the Wall Street Journal's publication schedules was a fraud condemned by
the securities laws. "Congress apparently has sought to proscribe ... trading
on material, nonpublic information obtained not through skill but through a
variety of "deceptive" practices, unlawful acts which we term
'misappropriation.'" Id., at 1031. Judge Miner dissented from the panel's
judgment. In his view:
[Vol. 78:13
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"[Section 10(b)) never was intended to protect the reputation, or enforce
the ethical standards, of a financial newspaper. . . . [The securities
fraud provisions were [not] designed to prohibit the type of fraudulent
conduct engaged in by these defendants. Such conduct is addressed
adequately by the statutes establishing the mail and mire fraud offenses
of which the defendants stand convicted." Id., at 1037.
II
A comparison of the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case with our recent
precedents demonstrates the need for examination by this Court of the mis-
appropriation theory. In Chiarella, we began our analysis of Rule lOb-5
with the proposition that parties to a business transaction generally do not
have an affirmative duty to disclose information about the transaction. The
Court noted, however, that a failure to disclose material information could be
fraudulent in certain circumstances. "But such liability is premised upon a
duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction." 445 U. S., at 230 (emphasis added). Such a duty
applied when corporate insiders traded in the securities of their corporation.
In such a case, "the duty arose from (1) the existence of a relationship af-
fording access to inside information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose, and (2) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." Id., at 227
(citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907, 912, and n. 15 (1961)).
In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983), we examined the circumstances
under which outsiders could be held liable under Rule lOb-5. We noted:
"[U]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consult-
ant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries
of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not
simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to informa-
tion solely for corporate purposes." Id., at 655, n. 14.
Thus, Dirks established that when outsiders have a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders, they cannot purchase securities from those shareholders with-
out first informing them of material information that might influence the de-
cision to purchase or sell the securities.
The Court also noted that even if a particular outsider were not under a fi-
duciary duty to the corporation's shareholders, he could not trade on infor-
mation that corporate insiders had disclosed to him improperly. See id., at
659-660. As the Court explained, "[T]ippee responsibility must be related
back to insider responsibility by a necessary, finding that the tippee knew the
information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a spe-
cial relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information. . . " Id., at 661
19981
HeinOnline  -- 78 B. U. L. Rev. 57 1998
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
(emphasis added) (quoting In re Investors Management Co., 44 S. E. C. 633
(1971)).
Applying these principles to this case, it is difficult to understand how any
of the petitioners were guilty of criminal securities fraud. The Court of Ap-
peals found no fiduciary relationship between any of the petitioners and the
parties from whom they purchased securities. The only fiduciary duty dis-
cussed by the court is petitioner Winans' duty to the Wall Street Journal.
But our previous decisions establish that the duty of an individual to his em-
ployer, alone, is insufficient to support an action under Rule lOb-5. The in-
quiry under that section must focus on "petitioner's relationship with the
sellers of the . . . securities. . . . " What we said in Chiarella is true here:
"[Petitioner] was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person
in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a
complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions." 445 U. S., at 232-233. As the petitioners in this case had no
fiduciary obligation to disclose the information before dealing in the securi-
ties, their convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are without support in
any prior decision of this Court.
III
In Chiarella, the Court had no occasion to address the merits of the mis-
appropriation theory. 445 U. S., at 236-237 and n. 21; id., at 237-238
(STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the
judgment). The question is important, because the theory broadens substan-
tially the ambit of criminal liability under the securities laws. There appears
to be little or no support for the decision below in the language or history of
the Securities Act of 1934.
The Court of Appeals has had three occasions to address the misappro-
priation theory since we left this question open in Chiarella. On each occa-
sion, it has embraced the theory. Because the Second Circuit includes New
York, the court's decision in this case is of special importance. In my view,
this case presents "an important question of federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court." S. Ct. R. 17.1(c). The time has come
for this Court to resolve that question. I dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari in this case.
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